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be taking on a new life. I will keep you in suspense
about what ideas I have in mind.
As always, any views expressed here are my
own and do not necessarily reflect the official
views of other Federal Open Market Committee
members.
THE FATE OF THE GREAT 
MODERATION
A common description of current events is
that some cherished theories about the macro-
economy have been shattered. One idea is that
the fabled resiliency of the U.S. economy over
the past several decades is being called into ques-
tion. Policymakers and academics alike have
described the period since the mid-1980s as the
Great Moderation, meaning that the volatility of
the economy has been markedly lower during
recent decades than it was in the earlier part of
the postwar era, and certainly much less than
during the interwar period during the 1920s and
1930s. Now, that moderation and resiliency may
be coming unraveled. If so, it would be a funeral
for the Great Moderation.
Is it really true that the Great Moderation is
coming to an end? My sense is that it is too early to
T
he U.S. economy continues to face
substantial turmoil. Financial markets
are under unusual stress. Wall Street
has been racked by seismic change.
Uncertainty over the future prospects for the U.S.
economy has caused consumers and businesses
to pull back on discretionary consumption and
investment spending. Doubts concerning the true
value of complex securities continue to weigh
heavily on financial markets worldwide. The still-
uncertain fate of housing markets has kept the
value of the underlying mortgage assets obscured.
The Federal Reserve has been active and
innovative in responding to the evolving turmoil
during 2008. In addition to deploying interest rate
cuts, the Fed has implemented a series of new and
unconventional tools. This innovation has inten-
sified in response to evolving market events.
There may be many more twists and turns in the
policy response going forward.
I will discuss the challenges my Federal
Reserve colleagues and I face as we strive to imple-
ment a policy that is designed to deliver low and
stable inflation along with maximum sustainable
employment. I will describe three funerals and a
wedding—that is, three ideas about the U.S.
economy that may be going to their final resting
place and one idea that, once left for dead, may
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makers and academics started talking about mod-
eration and resiliency in the first place. The main
idea is simple: Our primary measures of macro-
economic performance have been a lot less volatile
than they were before 1984. In particular, quarterly
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates for the
U.S. economy since 1945 show a clear change in
behavior beginning in the middle 1980s. After
1984, these growth rates are only about half as
volatile as they were during the earlier period.1
So, for the past 25 years, growth rate volatility has
dramatically moderated from what it was in the
1950s, 60s, and 70s (Figure 1).
Furthermore, this phenomenon is not limited
to real GDP growth rates. Almost all macroeco-
nomic data have been dramatically less volatile
since the mid-1980s, according to academic
research (Stock and Watson, 2003). So the Great
Moderation is a clear feature of the U.S. macro-
economic data since the mid-1980s. And, as is
often the case when the data show a clear pattern,
theories abound about the causes of this phenom-
enon. But all the theories have a common theme—
namely, that some important macroeconomic
event triggered a more stable, more resilient
American economy over the past 25 years.
Understandably, many are yearning for a
sense of stability today, and many are questioning
what happened to the resiliency and moderation
in the U.S. economy. Two areas stand out where
volatility has been particularly high since the cur-
rent financial turmoil began in earnest in August
2007. One is in certain interest rates and interest
rate spreads, especially in markets that have expe-
rienced severe difficulties since the turmoil began.
The closely watched LIBOR–Overnight Index
Swap spread, for instance, peaked at more than
300 basis points before retreating in recent weeks.
In July 2007, this spread was less than 10 basis
points (Figure 2). Another volatile area is the
equity markets: The Wilshire 5000 stock price
index, one of the broadest measures of equity
valuation, has been trading near its lows of 2002
Bullard
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1 For a discussion and some theorizing about the Great Moderation,
see Bullard and Singh (2007).
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Figure 1
Real GDP Growth, 1950:Q1–2008:Q3
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis and National Bureau of Economic Research.Bullard
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LIBOR, OIS, and Federal Funds Target Rate, January 3, 2007–December 10, 2008
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, British Bankers’ Association, Reuters.








Wilshire 5000 Price Index/Nominal GDP, 1980:Q1–2008:Q3
SOURCE: Wall Street Journal, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and National Bureau of Economic Research.and 2003 in the past few weeks (Figure 3). The
Chicago Board Options Exchange market volatility
index (VIX) was often above 60 during October
and November of this year; in July 2007 it was
below 20. The dramatic rise in volatility based
on numbers like these is clear (Figure 4).
Still, it is far too early to organize a funeral
for the Great Moderation. Even though financial
market volatility is exceptionally high and the
U.S. economy is contracting during the second
half of 2008, the demise of the Great Moderation
would require much more evidence than currently
exists. Real economic variables, in particular,
would have to swing much more than they have
to date, and the increased volatility would have
to continue for a number of years before we could
start to compare the current environment with the
pre-1984 experience and pronounce the modera-
tion dead. Real GDP has fallen by half a percent
at an annual rate in the third quarter of this year.2
To be sure, fourth-quarter 2008 output is expected
to fall sharply, followed by further but less-severe
contraction in the first quarter of 2009. If that
scenario materializes, the contour of the current
recession will look much the same as that of the
1990-91 recession. As bad as that feels, it is not
enough to undo 25 years of moderated behavior
in the U.S. economy.
CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL
MARKETPLACE
It is no secret that the current financial market
turmoil has brought about once-unimaginable
changes on Wall Street. One telling sign of the
magnitude of these changes is that the U.S. econ-
omy began 2008 with five large investment banks
but will exit the year with zero. Without question,
financial market turmoil since August 2007 is
radically altering the nature of U.S. financial
intermediation. I think it is fair to say that we are
witnessing a funeral for the financial system we
have known over the past two decades.
Bullard
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Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX, January 3, 2007–December 10, 2008
SOURCE: Wall Street Journal.
2 The BEA preliminary estimate was released November 25, 2008.A key culprit has been the illiquidity of
mortgage-backed securities and related financial
instruments. Many financial firms simply did not
manage risk exposure on these securities well
and as a result have struggled with losses and
write-downs. The International Monetary Fund
(2008) has estimated that more than $1.4 trillion
of losses will have to be absorbed by the financial
sector before all is said and done in this episode
and that only a portion of these losses have been
accounted for to date. The opacity of the finan-
cial instruments involved has kept everyone
guessing as to where these losses truly lie, which
explains a lot about how events have unfolded
during 2008. No firm has an incentive to declare
that it may suffer debilitating losses, and so mar-
kets have to discover which firms are insolvent
and which are likely to survive and build market
share in the post-shakeout industry structure.
The sharp downturn in the real economy during
the fall of 2008 has intensified the pressure. In
the meantime, firms have become wary of trading
with one another, certain markets have ceased
normal functioning, and market participants and
policymakers alike have been confronted with a
series of announcements from firms near bank-
ruptcy. In a November 17 New York Times edito-
rial, Treasury Secretary Paulson named the litany
of firms experiencing “failure, or the equivalent
of failures”: Bear Stearns, IndyMac, Lehman
Brothers, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the American International
Group (Paulson, 2008).
The Federal Reserve has been forced to impro-
vise in response to firms’ announcements of this
nature. The key concern has been that, if impor-
tant financial market players are failing, the failure
should occur in an orderly way with the lowest
level of market disruption. In the banking sector,
there are well-established procedures for resolving
a failed institution in an orderly way. These pro-
cedures have served the nation well both during
the current crisis and during the savings and loan
episode during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It
is very important to recognize that there are no
such procedures in the non-bank financial sector
today. This regulatory gap is likely to be a primary
focal point for discussions of the future of finan-
cial market regulation. In particular, any reform
has to address the question of whether—and how—
to set up systems to resolve failing non-bank
financial firms in an orderly way. The current
system—bankruptcy court—is not working.
As the shakeout process has unfolded during
2008, markets have been continually bracing for
further surprise announcements from financial
firms. The policy response to this situation has
been exceptionally aggressive (Table 1). Consider
the largest S&P 500 financial firms by assets as of
the fourth quarter of 2007. The first 47 firms on
the list accounted for 95 percent of the total assets
held by the sector as of the fourth quarter of 2007.
As of mid-summer 2008, just one of these financial
firms had been the focus of a direct policy response
of any kind. That firm was Bear Stearns, which,
back in March, was purchased by JPMorgan Chase
with help from the Fed. Almost all the others were
operating as they had during recent years. The
situation is dramatically different today. At the
time of this writing, 22 of the 47 have received
capital injections under the Treasury’s Troubled
Assets Relief Program (TARP) effort. Three of
these are non-bank financial firms that changed
their charters to become bank holding companies,
including two of the largest firms on the list,
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, and just
recently American Express. Several other firms
on the list merged with stronger partners, includ-
ing Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch
(both acquired by Bank of America), National City
(acquired by PNC), Wachovia (acquired by Wells
Fargo), and Sovereign Bancorp (approved acqui-
sition by Banco Santander). The assets and debt
obligations of Washington Mutual were purchased
by JPMorgan Chase. Lehman Brothers went to
bankruptcy court, but important portions of the
company were acquired by Barclay’s Capital.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into
conservatorship. American International Group
has a restructured loan arrangement with the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Citigroup has
entered into an agreement to receive a package
of guarantees, liquidity access, and capital from
the government. These events have touched 33 of
the 47 firms on the list. This means that much of
the uncertainty surrounding the fate of U.S. finan-
Bullard
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Table 1
Status of Large S&P 500 Financial Firms
 
1-year 
percent change  Total assets  Percent of   
in stock price  ($ billions) total assets in  Cumulative   
Firm 11/30/07–11/28/08 (2007:Q4) S&P 500 financials percent                
Citigroup Inc. –75% $2,187.63 10.93% 10.93%                
               
         
Bank of America Corp. –65 1,715.75 8.57 19.50          
JPMorgan Chase & Co. –31 1,562.15 7.80 27.31            
       
Goldman Sachs Group –65 1,119.80 5.59 32.90      
American International Group –97 1,060.51 5.30 38.20                    
               
                 
                 
 
Morgan Stanley –72 1,045.41 5.22 43.42      
Merrill Lynch –78 1,020.05 5.10 48.52          
Fannie Mae –97 882.55 4.41 53.93    
Federal Home Loan Mtg. –97 794.37 3.97 56.90    
Wachovia Corp. –87 782.90 3.91 60.81      
Lehman Bros. –100 691.06 3.45 64.26                
Wells Fargo –11 575.44 2.88 67.14  
MetLife Inc. –56 558.56 2.79 69.93
Prudential Financial –77 485.81 2.43 72.35  
Hartford Financial Services Group –91 360.36 1.80 74.16
Washington Mutual N/A 327.91 1.64 75.79              
U.S. Bancorp –18 237.62 1.19 76.98
Countrywide Financial Corp. N/A 211.73 1.06 78.04        
Bank of New York Mellon Corp. –37 197.66 0.99 79.03
Lincoln National –78 191.44 0.96 79.98
SunTrust Banks –55 179.57 0.90 80.88
Allstate Corp. –50 156.41 0.78 81.66
SLM Corporation –76 155.56 0.78 82.44  
Principal Financial Group –79 154.52 0.77 83.21    
Capital One Financial –35 150.59 0.75 83.96            
National City Corp. –90 150.37 0.75 84.71      
American Express –60 149.83 0.75 85.46                
         
State Street Corp. –47 142.54 0.71 86.17
Regions Financial Corp. –61 141.04 0.70 86.88
PNC Financial Services –28 138.92 0.69 87.57          
BB&T Corporation –17 132.62 0.66 88.24
The Travelers Companies Inc. –18 115.22 0.58 88.81
Genworth Financial Inc. –94 114.32 0.57 89.38
SOURCE: Securities and Exchange Commission, Standard & Poor’s, Federal Reserve Board, Wall Street Journal, and Government 
Accountability Office.Bullard
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Capital from
  government
            investment plan
                ($ billions)
    Type of firm Current status (as of 12/11/2008) as of 12/11/08
  BHC According to 11/24/08 plan: Treasury and FDIC backstop of 45
$300 billion in troubled assets; additional $20 billion stake
in the firm by the Treasury.
      BHC Acquired Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch. 15
      BHC Acquired Bear Stearns. Acquired Washington Mutual’s  25
secured debt obligations and deposits.
    BHC Has become a BHC. 10
    Insurance Restructured plan, as of 11/10/08: $4 billion equity stake by  40
government, $30 billion in funds on securities underlying 
the firm’s CDS, $22.5 billion to buy residential mortgage 
securities. It will reduce the previous credit line to 
$60 billion.
  BHC Has become a BHC. 10
  Inv. bank Acquired by Bank of America. 10
  GSE Placed into conservatorship. —
      GSE Placed into conservatorship. —
  BHC Bought by Wells Fargo. —
  Inv. bank Filed for bankruptcy; Barclay’s has acquired important pieces. —
  Thrift Bought Wachovia. 25
  Insurance — —
  Financial adv./insurance — —
      Insurance — —
  Thrift Assets and debt obligations bought by JPMorgan Chase. —
  BHC — 6.599
    Thrift Merged into Bank of America. —
          BHC — 3
  Insurance — —
  BHC — 3.5
  Insurance — —
  Credit services — —
    Financial adv./asset mgmt. — —
    BHC Announced agreement to purchase Chevy Chase Bank. —
    BHC Bought by PNC Financial. 3.555
  BHC Converted to BHC on 11/10/08, requested access to  —
$3.5 billion TARP funds on 11/12/08.
    BHC — 2
    BHC — 3.5
    BHC Acquired National City Corporation on 10/24/08. —
  BHC — 3.134
      Insurance — —
    Insurance — —
                               
 cial companies has been addressed in one manner
or another during the past several months. Turmoil
is still significant, to be sure, but the policy
response has been very aggressive, and many of
the largest uncertainties have been addressed.
FUNERAL FOR A FRIEND
The financial market turmoil began during
the summer of 2007. The initial analysis—widely
accepted among policymakers and forecasters—
suggested that problems in the subprime sector
of the mortgage markets were unlikely to be large
enough to have a substantial impact on the U.S.
economy outside the financial sector. Markets
seemed to confirm this judgment during the fall
of 2007, as equity indexes peaked. By late 2007,
however, it became apparent that problems were
going to be more difficult and long-lasting than
the original analysis suggested. Real GDP growth
in the fourth quarter of 2007 was slightly negative
based on the revised data available today. Employ -
ment growth turned negative in January 2008.
The Fed responded to the weakening economy
by easing aggressively, lowering the target federal
funds rate by 225 basis points during the first few
months of 2008 all the way down to 2 percent.
During the summer, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) went on hold, but intensified
turmoil during the fall combined with weaker-
than-expected data on the real economy triggered
further easing moves during October. This has left
the FOMC with a federal funds target at a low
level, with further easing possible as weak data
roll in over the next several months (Figure 5A).
Whether the FOMC decides to stay on hold
at this point or eases further and then stays on
hold at some lower level, even zero, may not be
the most critical question. The fact is, monetary
policy defined as movements in short-term nomi-
nal interest rates is coming to an end, at least for
now. It’s a funeral for a friend.
The end of nominal interest rate targeting in
the United States for the near term means that
Bullard
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Table 1, cont’d
Status of Large S&P 500 Financial Firms
 
1-year 
percent change  Total assets  Percent of   
in stock price  ($ billions) total assets in  Cumulative   
Firm 11/30/07–11/28/08 (2007:Q4) S&P 500 financials percent                
Fifth Third Bancorp –68% $110.96 0.55% 89.94%
Ameriprise Financial Inc. –69 109.23 0.55 90.48  
KeyCorp –64 99.98 0.50 90.98
Bear Stearns Cos. N/A 96.08 0.48 91.46              
CIT Group –87 90.25 0.45 91.91  
Sovereign Bancorp –79 84.75 0.42 92.34          
Loews Corp. –43 76.08 0.38 92.72
ACE Limited –13 72.09 0.36 93.08
Northern Trust Corp. –43 67.61 0.34 93.41
AFLAC Inc. –26 65.81 0.33 93.74
M&T Bank Corp. –29 64.88 0.32 94.07
E*Trade Financial Corp. –71 64.19 0.32 94.39  
Comerica Inc. –51 62.33 0.31 94.70
Marshall & Ilsley Corp. –51 58.30 0.29 94.99
SOURCE: Securities and Exchange Commission, Standard & Poor’s, Federal Reserve Board, Wall Street Journal, and Government 
Accountability Office.much more attention will have to be paid to alter-
native ideas about controlling inflation and infla-
tion expectations going forward. An important
characteristic of the current environment is that
medium-term inflation expectations seem to be
spreading out dramatically, with some analysis
warning of high inflation, others warning of defla-
tion, and still others expecting inflation to remain
near the levels recently experienced. 
One focus of analysis over the coming quarters
will be the experience in Japan. Japan was buffeted
by large declines in equity and real estate markets
in the early 1990s. In response, the Bank of Japan
lowered nominal interest rates to near zero by the
middle of that decade, and it has not been above
1 percent since. An important part of the outcome
in Japan has been a rate of deflation that has
averaged about 1 percent since the mid-1990s
(Figure 5B). Deflation, should it occur in the
United States, might be particularly challenging
because some of our current core problems are in
housing markets, where contracts are written in
nominal terms. An unexpected deflation would
make those contracts more expensive for 
borrowers.
One idea from the Japanese experience is that
with nominal interest rates at very low levels,
more attention may have to be paid to quantitative
measures of monetary policy. By announcing and
maintaining targets for key monetary quantities,
the Fed may be able to keep inflation and inflation
expectations near target and ward off either a drift
toward deflation or excessively high inflation.
This will be an important issue for the Fed in
coming months and represents a challenge in the
communication of monetary policy going forward.
A REBIRTH
So far, I have discussed three funerals, ideas
whose times may have passed. I now want to turn
to a macroeconomic idea that is being rehabili-
tated as we speak. That idea is fiscal policy—in
particular, the spending side of fiscal policy and
the idea of more direct intervention in the affairs
of private sector firms.
Bullard
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Capital from
  government
            investment plan
                ($ billions)
    Type of firm Current status (as of 12/11/2008) as of 12/11/08
    BHC — 3.45
    Financial adv. — —
BHC — 2.5
    Inv. bank Fed arranged merger with JP Morgan Chase. —
  Credit services — —
  Thrift Approved takeover by Banco Santander 10/13/08 —
  Insurance/hotels — —
  Insurance — —
    BHC — 1.576
  Insurance — —
    BHC — 0.6
    Inv. brokerage — 0.8
  BHC — 2.25
      BHC — 1.715
                               
 Bullard
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A. Federal Funds Rate and CPI Inflation Rate, January 1986–November 2008
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SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.At least since the 1980s, fiscal policy defined
by deficit spending has had a negative connotation
in many macroeconomic policy circles. Former
Council of Economic Advisers Chairman N. Greg
Mankiw, writing in 1991, listed as his “dubious
Keynesian proposition #4” the idea that “fiscal
policy is a powerful tool for economic stabiliza-
tion.” He included this sentence: “In the United
States today, fiscal policymakers have completely
abdicated responsibility for economic stabiliza-
tion.” That was 1991, but I think it is a fair assess-
ment of the thinking in much of the economics
profession up until the current financial market
turmoil. Fiscal policy, at least in the United States,
was viewed as important for the macroeconomy,
but from a longer-run perspective. To the extent
there are stabilization goals—goals requiring
time-critical policy interventions—the usual idea
is that certain types of tax cuts might be beneficial,
but that otherwise the effort is best left to monetary
policy. Not least in this thinking is that the Fed can
act relatively quickly, while the political process
tends to be much slower and more cumbersome.
Yet, during the fall of 2008 in particular, fiscal
policy conceived of as more direct intervention in
the operation of private sector firms has emerged
as a leading tool to combat ongoing financial
market turmoil. This is so, not just in the United
States, but globally.3 The passage of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), with author-
ization for the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion
to help return financial markets to more normal
operation, has put the focus going forward
squarely on fiscal responses. This created in a
matter of weeks a very different policy environ-
ment from the one that had existed in the United
States for the past 25 years.
The original idea behind the EESA was to
create a market for the illiquid asset-backed secu-
rities and related instruments that are at the heart
of the present situation. These assets have current
prices, to the extent that they can be determined,
that are very low, the so-called fire sale price,
because so many firms would like to sell their
holdings and few buyers exist in the current cli-
mate. However, these securities also have a higher,
hold-to-maturity price that reflects the likely value
of the stream of revenue for a patient investor who
is willing to simply hold the asset for a period
of time. Under the original EESA proposal, the
government would play the role of the patient
investor, buying the securities at a reverse auction
and holding them or selling them at a future
moment when financial market stress has receded.
In principle, this idea could be executed at no
ultimate cost to the taxpayer, although taxpayer
money would be put at risk.4 An important part
of the concept is that taxpayer money would be
used to purchase assets that would then be sold
in the future, recouping most or all of the initial
outlay. The government would not have to pur-
chase all assets, only enough to credibly create a
market. I thought such a program, if it could be
executed on a sufficient scale, may have helped
to liquefy illiquid asset-backed securities markets
and so may have helped progress toward an
orderly financial market consolidation. This, in
turn, would have helped to reduce or eliminate
the downside risk to economic performance.
As events have transpired, the asset-purchase
program has been put on hold. Given the rapid
flow of events, capital purchases came to be
viewed during the autumn as a simpler, more
timely, and more direct method of intervention.
The Treasury’s capital injection program has taken
the bulk of the resources from the first $350 bil-
lion tranche of the $700 billion appropriation. 
CONCLUSIONS
I have described three funerals and a wedding.
The ongoing financial market turmoil may have
caused the death of many cherished ideas about
Bullard
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3 International Monetary Fund (2008, “Recent Central Bank and
Government Actions,” pp. 7-10).
4 One place to look for a model for handling financial crises of this
magnitude is the Nordic countries during the early 1990s. For a
recent summary, see the speech by my friend and colleague Seppo
Honkapohja, a governor at the Bank of Finland (Honkapohja, 2008).
These countries were hit by severe financial turmoil and sharp
recessions, in part associated with currency crises, in the early
1990s. The general response was for the governments to take equity
positions in banks and to manage the resulting consolidation in
the industry. As Honkapohja documents, the ultimate expense to
the taxpayers in these countries was less than the initial outlay of
government funds. how the macroeconomy operates. One funeral was
for the idea of the Great Moderation. Certainly
financial markets have seen exceptional volatility
recently, and some behavior in those markets has
been unprecedented. Still, I am not ready to bury
the Great Moderation yet—we will need a lot more
very volatile data on the real side of the economy
to truly depart from the experience of the past 25
years. A second funeral was for our financial sys-
tem as we have known it. That transformation has
occurred and continues, with repercussions for
U.S. and global financial market regulation. A
third funeral was for monetary policy defined as
nominal interest rate targeting. At least over the
near term, any additional influence through
interest rate reductions will be limited, and the
focus of monetary policy may turn to quantity
measures. The wedding—the idea on the rise—is
fiscal policy defined as more direct intervention
in certain parts of the private sector. While the
Fed will continue to be innovative in providing
liquidity to markets through existing facilities
and possibly some new programs, an important
part of the response to ongoing financial market
turmoil will come from fiscal policy intervention.
This runs counter to much of the thinking in
macroeconomic policy circles over the past two
decades. It may be discomforting or rewarding
or both, but stabilization policy in the coming
months and quarters is likely to look very different
from what we have been accustomed to seeing.
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